S
eventy years a er the end of the Second World War (WWII) and over twenty years a er the collapse of the Soviet Union, historical studies on both the 'short' and the 'long' post-war eras in Europe are ourishing.
e perspectives and topics in this eld are wide-ranging. At least from the early 2000s onwards, the emphasis has been shi ing from the muchstudied subjects of Cold War politics and the economic and social history of reconstruction toward cultural historical studies on individual and collective experiences and memory. 1 A key reason for this change is well expressed by Frank Biess, who has approached the post-war period in Germany from a cultural and socialhistorical angle, noting that 'postwar societies needed to face more than just the classical tasks of reintegrating returning soldiers or even of converting a wartime to a peacetime economy. ' ere was also the massive e ort needed to 'come to terms with the legacies' of unprecedented ethnic cleansing and genocide. 2 Understanding and discussing -as well as willfully neglecting -these legacies have been fundamental elements of post-war European identities and politics. In this respect, it is still relevant today to study the a er-e ects of war in Europe. One crucial task is to map the di erent spheres and dimensions of the transition from war to peace and to try to nd intranational, as well as international connections between them -if there are any -thus slowly gaining a fuller picture of the 'European a ermath' from 1945 to the 1990s. 3 Nevertheless, the socio-cultural impacts of WWII have so far not yet attracted the same amount of scholarship as the impacts of the First World War. According to Pieter Lagrou, this is partly due to the broadly shared European experience of violence in [1914] [1915] [1916] [1917] [1918] , whereas the memories of violence in 1939-1945 were more varied, divisive and contested in di erent parts of Europe. 4 Furthermore, right up until the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, Europe remained very much a post-war continent, scarred as it was by the Iron Curtain. is prolonged acuteness of the a ermath may have made it di cult to write a closing chapter to the era. Finally, sixty years a er 1945, the late Tony Judt published his magisterial Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, which is so far the most comprehensive account of the long post-war period. is is largely due to Judt's skill and insight in including the o -forgotten histories of Central and Eastern European countries in his narrative. Judt powerfully demonstrates the burdens and su ering of the civilian populations and the massive destruction of cities and infrastructure especially in German-occupied countries, 5 where, east of the Elbe, the liberation from the Germans in 1944-1945 brought rst the merciless maelstrom of war and then a new form of totalitarian regime under the Soviets. In this area between Berlin and Moscow, which had already su ered the worst of both the Stalinist terror and the Holocaust, the Anglo-American narrative of a 'good war ' in 1939-1945 could hardly have been more inappropriate. 6 
'Zero Hour' and the Continuation of Violence
It is partly against this background that the popular concept of 'zero hour' (die Stunde Null) should perhaps be criticised. e term has been used to refer to Germany's total defeat and setting the clock back to zero, so that May 1945 would mark a fresh start and a decisive break from the past. ere was a dire need to forget the horrors of the past decades and to start a whole new era, both politically and individually. Morally, too, the idea of a 'zero hour' helped to distance the post-war Germans from the Nazi regime and all its crimes. In this sense, the concept captures an essential (German) experience and sentiment at the end of the war. 7 However, Mark Mazower among others has challenged the 'old idea that 1945 had been a kind of Year Zero' . 8 For many in Central and Eastern Europe, the capitulation of Germany did not mean an end to violence and totalitarianism, but its continuation; and the direct consequences of war could not simply be pushed aside. In Germany itself, despite the denazi cation and re-education programs, many of the former Nazi o cials and authorities retained their positions. 9 A er the war, the legitimacy of o cial authorities was weak everywhere in continental Europe. e reasons for this are obvious in the defeated countries. But also in those countries that had been occupied by Germany during the war, many of the local o ce-holders had served the occupiers in one way or another. In the Soviet-controlled areas, there was a strong pressure to purge fascist or allegedly fascist-a liated functionaries. 10 In addition to such systematic campaigns, spontaneous acts of revenge and cleansings by outraged people were also widespread. Tens of thousands of Europeans continued to be killed in this way, just as they had before the end of hostilities; while in Western Europe, too, death sentences were a common occurrence.
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e continuation of wartime atrocities, expulsions, and purges well into the post-war period is now a widely recognised aspect of the human history of the a ermath, and there is a growing amount of research on these traumatic topics. e staggering number of refugees and displaced people in Europe threatened further human disaster and required huge and immediate relief e orts. In the area of the former ird Reich, there were over 10 million foreign slave labourers and concentration camp victims that needed to either return to homes that had been destroyed or nd new ones. 12 A er the war, as many as 20 million people su ered forced migration and ethnic cleansing; around 13 million of these were Germans from Central Eastern Europe now moved to the new, smaller Germany. 13 e situation of displaced and o en also orphaned children was especially grave. 14 In the nal stages of the war and in its immediate wake, it has become clear that hundreds of thousands if not over a million girls and women were raped by Soviet soldiers in German areas or in countries allied to Germany. 15 is violent mayhem, which Hitler's murderous regime had brought upon the German people as a whole, is still a source of the troublesome politics of memory and victimisation. 16 Immediately a er the war, Germans tended to downplay their concentration and extermination camps as no worse than the Soviet gulags. Frank Biess has categorised the narratives of victimisation in East and West Germany into Christian, social-democratic, and communist: in the West, 'the most in uential promoters of narratives of victimisation were the Christian churches' . 17 At the end of WWII, millions of men were either in military service or in foreign captivity. In Europe, the demobilisation of vast armies in di erent countries is still a relatively little-studied subject. 18 In the United States, on the other hand, the homecoming of 'the greatest generation' and the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (the G.I. Bill of Rights) has gained more attention. Michael D. Gambone has called this act 'arguably the greatest social-welfare program in U.S. history' . 19 A er the G.I. Bill, the educational status of American veterans improved greatly, and the number of university students soared -as it did in many European countries, too. 20 In the Soviet Union the demobilisation of over 8.5 million Red Army soldiers posed a gigantic task. All in all, the e ort lasted until the end of 1948, and despite the positive tone of the o cial propaganda, there were serious shortcomings and much corruption involved in providing proper housing and jobs for the veterans. 21 e brutal treatment of close to six million Soviet prisoners of war by the Germans in 1941-1945 had resulted in over three million deaths, and subsequently those who survived o en had to face harsh treatment as 'traitors' from their own Soviet regime. 22 In the case of Germany, the return of approximately two million prisoners of war from Soviet captivity lasted until the 1950s. 23 Of the former German allies, Italy, Finland, Rumania and Bulgaria had changed sides in 1943-1944 and turned their armies against the Germans. Hungary, by contrast, was occupied by Germany in March 1944 and was then made to follow the Nazi regime into the abyss of its nal defeat. As a consequence, over half a million Hungarian soldiers and civilians were taken prisoner by the Red Army. eir return to Hungary continued until 1956, while an estimated 100,000-150,000 Hungarians perished in Soviet captivity.
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Gendered Experiences of Reintegration
So far, according to David A. Gerber, the history of those le disabled by the war has not received enough attention. eir post-war situation was especially troublesome in defeated or occupied countries. 25 In Austria, for instance, the mere presence of war invalids was an unwelcome reminder of the Nazi past, clashing with the cherished myth of Austria as 'the rst victim of National Socialism ' . 26 us, the soldiers' homecoming did not just mean bringing celebrated heroes back into society; indeed, especially where defeated nations, prisoners of war, and serious physical and mental traumas were concerned. Rather, their return could be perceived as a crisis of masculinity; 27 in terms of the concrete wounds in men's bodies and the symbolic wounds in the image of military men. is image had been closely linked to the national identity, had now raised the question of rede ning the ideals of manliness. In his ne study of prisoners of war in both Germanies, Frank Biess has studied the gure of a physically and mentally exhausted POW coming home from Soviet captivity and described how this gure contrasted so sharply with the previous wartime image of heroic, martial, and aggressive German soldiers. Especially in West Germany, homecomers were encouraged 'to win back their masculinity' by taking on a strong, even authoritarian, position in their families and becoming the breadwinners, thus allowing (or forcing) women to return to more traditional roles.
28
In the analysis of post-war masculinities and gender roles, the concept of 'remasculinisation' has been used to describe this social, cultural, and political process; one where manly subjectivity and authority is reclaimed in a post-war society and simultaneously regenerates a national self-image of coherence and strength.
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Practically all war veteran surveys in di erent countries have shown that the veterans did not want to share their experiences with anyone else than their former military comrades. 30 For instance, General George S. Patton noted in his diary in the summer of 1945, '[n]one of them [civilians] realizes that one cannot ght for two and a half years and be the same'; 31 and there were many young war veterans who had fought much longer. During the past een years, the terms 'shell shock' and 'trauma' have become focal keywords in studies on WWI. 32 is vein of research is now also becoming visible in research on WWII and its a ermath, although the image of a mentally broken soldier is not so iconic here as for 1914-18. 33 ere have been attempts to apply the present-day psychiatric diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in interpreting the psychological consequences of WWII, but such an approach poses some serious problems. Born in the wake of the Vietnam War (and thus in a particular societal and cultural context) PTSD as a medical category is perhaps not the best-suited concept for understanding the trauma of war in a historical context.
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For a long time now, the study of women and war has been an active eld in women's history. Among the key issues has been the question of the signi cance of war for the women's movement and female emancipation. As a consequence of total mobilisation in both world wars, vast numbers of women entered formerly 'male-only spheres' of employment -e.g., farm work, various public services, schools, and military auxiliary work. Many contemporary feminists consider the years 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 to have represented periods that saw the greatest progress in women's selfcon dence and the women's movement. On the other hand, as many scholars have stressed, this emancipatory progress seems to have been quite shortlived: on the level of cultural norms and values, war could also reinforce traditional gender roles and attitudes, and the wartime deployment of women to 'male tasks' was commonly followed by a post-war backlash in which women were pushed back into the 'female sphere' of the home and marriage. 35 Indeed, reuniting families and re-establishing homes became one of the major tasks in post-war Europe. Naturally, the urge to return to the normalcy and safety of 'how it used to be' was felt deeply by the majority of postwar populations; this is easy to understand socially and psychologically. However, the return was also a political project that aimed at stabilising and bolstering shattered societies. Usually this stability was conceived on the basis of a conservative view of the family. Our image of the 1950s as a decade of stability, homogeneity and traditional family values may be partly a cliché, but as a stereotype it certainly re ects the zeitgeist to some extent.
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In Europe of the 1940s and 1950s, the shattering e ects of war also gave birth to a moral panic about the 'immoral' attitudes and behaviour of post-war youth. With a future that looked dim and uncertain, it was commonplace to project these fears and insecurities onto the alleged moral depravity and deviance of adolescents.
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Politics of Remembrance and Victimhood
e study of memories, remembrance, and memory politics has been one of the most ourishing elds in the cultural history of war. 38 is is especially true with regard to the memory culture of WWI, which has produced a rich body of literature. 39 e Second World War created a haunting memory of completely new dimensions, especially because of the Holocaust, the massive human costs of total war and forced migration, and the advent of the atomic age. Nevertheless, and despite the immediate post-war revelations and trials of war crimes, Western Europe in the 1950s was much more concerned with economic reconstruction and social stabilisation than making any critical evaluation of the recent past. It may be surprising to see how late in the 1960s and 1970s the testimonies of the Holocaust and the war of annihilation in the East made their way into European -and especially German -memory culture. Although not forgotten, this genocidal past had not occupied a central place in remembering the war. Today, this remembrance of perpetration seems to be contested by memory discourses which again emphasise the victimhood of the Germans produced by the Allied strategic bombing campaign and the expulsion of the civilian population from the East.
In the countries east of the Iron Curtain, the post-war memory culture was to a great extent dominated by an endeavour to legitimise the new Stalinist rule and to build up a cult of the glorious Red Army. As a result, the memory of non-communist victims and opponents of the Nazi regime was o cially ignored, as was Stalinist responsibility for the war and any cruelties committed by the liberating Red Army. ese harsh memories have nevertheless survived well in the form of personal and family remembrance in Eastern and Central Europe. As the historian Krisztián Ungváry has said of the Hungarian memory culture of the war, one of the tragic consequences of the Red Army's brutalities against the civilian population in [1944] [1945] was that the Hungarians were thus allowed to escape from confronting their own responsibility for the war and the Holocaust: among the memories of the war, it was the su ering of one's own kin and people that remained in the foreground. 41 A er the collapse of the Soviet system there is now nally public space for the open contemplation of historical responsibilities and forgotten victims -but unfortunately also for revanchist and chauvinistic reinterpretations of the past.
e horri c legacy of 1939-1945 has made it quite di cult to remember WWII with much glory. Despite the Anglo-American memory narrative of saving democracy from totalitarianism and the Soviet epic of the Great Patriotic War, the fundamental experience of war for so many Europeans was that of immense personal losses and o en meaningless hardships. Of the victorious European nations, only Great Britain (though greatly weakened) and the Soviet Union avoided total collapse and occupation. is means that overall, the memory culture of WWII in Europe is very much one of defeat. 42 One of the central themes in research has thus been the memory and remembrance of the fallen, but here, too, most of the studies have focused on the victims of the First World War. However, the 'memory boom' of the past twenty years is clearly visible in studies dealing with WWII and its a ermath as well. 43 Instead of national or collective memory cultures, many recent studies have shown the fragmentation, diversity, and controversial nature of memories among di erent groups and individuals. Jay Winter, who is critical of the concept collective memory, prefers to use the term historical remembrance, which 'overlaps with personal or family remembrance on the one hand and religious remembrance, so central to sacred practices, on the other' . Historical remembrance may be seen as an interpretation of the past, which includes both history and memory. 44 Even now, seventy years a er the end of WWII, our historical understanding of 1939-1945 is closely bound up with the active cultures of remembrance of those who have direct experiences of those years. In the a ermath of the seventieth anniversary of 1945, it is still too early to regard the postwar period as mere history; at the time of writing these lines, the memory politics and rhetoric of WWII and its a ermath are again being used, and perhaps abused, to serve contemporary power politics in Eastern Europe.
Between Victors: is Volume e following six chapters will o er case studies that concretise many of the issues described above. is anthology brings into focus some of the lesser known histories of the a ermath; in addition to Germany, the studies discuss the di erent aspects of the post-1945 situations in Estonia, Poland, Austria, Finland, and Hungary. e rationale of the book is to study the a ermath of WWII from three overlapping angles: defeat, gender, and the countries between the victors. It is very important to pay attention to these countries that have escaped the standard Western and Soviet narratives of liberation and post-war development as they produce a more nuanced and o en ambiguous picture of that troubled period. is is what makes the study of Hungarian, Austrian, Polish, Estonian, Finnish, and German cases interesting.
During WWII, the Baltic countries were subject to successive occupations by the Soviet Union and Germany. Anu Mai Kõll writes about the situation in Estonia at the end of the war. Estonia had to deal with a foreign occupying power yet again, and a new political regime. Establishing a new political order in Estonia meant vetting the population in order to nd trustworthy citizens as well as possible traitors and threats to the new rulers. us, for the Estonian people, reorientation meant understanding and complying with the requirements of the new regime. e Estonian case shows how people survived a di cult new situation by adapting in one locality (Viljandimaa). As Kõll points out, the success of the repressive Soviet policies was possible because local Estonian people agreed to cooperate. Cooperation could be, for instance, either a survival strategy, an opportunity for social mobility, or a means of settling scores. ere is no one single story to explain post-war reorientation in Estonia.
Marta Kurkowska-Budzan examines Polish post-war experiences in a country that was forced to become a part of the communist bloc. Her chapter's focus is on anti-communist partisans in Poland and how they a erwards explained their decision to join and then to leave the anticommunist resistance. Kurkowska-Budzan presents the perceptions of the people themselves, the recollections of 'ordinary' soldiers, and especially of those who at some point ceased to pursue the anti-communist struggle and tried to adapt to civilian life. ose who did not do so, either died in ghting or vanished in prisons. e former soldiers interviewed by KurkowskaBudzan between 2003 and 2008 give us a glimpse into a kind of lost post-war history, which was subsequently vindicated a er the collapse of communism. However, the life histories of former anti-communist partisans are less tales of unfaltering heroism, and more o en of survival and adaptation to usually undesirable circumstances.
Unlike in 1918, the German defeat of 1945 was total and unconditional. With millions of working-age men in foreign captivity and the country in ruins, the immediate post-war era in Germany has been called the hour of the woman. Marianne Zepp studies those West German women activists, who early on rose to the task of drawing inevitable conclusions about the bankruptcy of Nazism and who were ready and able to seek out a new path towards a democratic, liberal and more gender-equal Germany. eir e orts ran in parallel with the re-education policies of the western powers, the aim of which was to eradicate Nazism and totalitarianism. At the onset of the Cold War, this anti-totalitarianism was increasingly meant to counter the spread of communism, too, and so in this emerging, polarised context of the 1950s, public and non-partisan women's activism then had to give way to party-centred and largely male-dominated politics.
Maria Fritsche looks at the processes of normalisation and the rede nition of masculinities in post-war Austrian lm culture. In her discussion of three distinct lm genres, Fritsche demonstrates how the construction of a national identity is intertwined with the construction of masculinities: 'real' Austrian males were depicted as sensitive, peace-loving and cheerful -thus distancing both Austrian men and the Austrian nation from the common past with Nazi Germany. Although this new masculinity enabled 'so er' versions of manliness and more equal gender relations, it did not mean giving up the traditional, patriarchal hierarchy altogether. Fritsche's analysis reminds us how cultural identities and a changing society are mutually constitutive and how constructions of gender have a crucial signi cance in this process.
e memory of war is tightly connected to a nation's self-image and collective imagination. Tiina Kinnunen analyses Finnish memory culture of war from the 1950s to 2005 through a discussion of public representations of war that point to important changes in the social, cultural and political frameworks that shape public remembrance.
e image of the Finnish woman in wartime played a crucial role in the 'memory wars' a er 1945. Representations of wartime women as pure and innocent have maintained the patriotic values of the nation, whereas the image of an immoral, sexually active women has been used to depict the wretchedness of war and the decay of pre-war and wartime conservative patriotism. During the 1990s, as Kinnunen shows, the dutiful sacri ce and su ering of Finnish women came to symbolise the victimhood of a small nation defending itself against a huge aggressive Soviet neighbour. In the midst of these national rede nitions and contested memory politics, the vast variety of women's personal memory narratives is easily forgotten, instrumentalised, and sometimes silenced.
In Eastern and Central Europe, the end of WWII did not mean the end of violence. Together with ethnic cleansing and deportations in 1945 and the years immediately a er, the question of sexual violence has perhaps been the most di cult and painful to address. Andrea Pető investigates here the ways in which the rapes committed by Red Army soldiers in Hungary could be studied and made visible; but there are two problems. First, the 'ethnicisation' of rape crimes blurs the gendered nature of this violence in a wider military culture, and neglects the fact that Hungarian soldiers also committed rapes in the Soviet Union when they were the occupying force. Second, a study into this topic should respect the dignity and agency of the women who su ered sexual violence, instead of forcing them to remain eternal victims. e images of raped women are also very strong and can draw attention away from the women's own voices. us, the real su erings from the past may become political instruments in constructing collective victim identities, and projecting the perpetrator status on speci c targets.
e six chapters in the current volume o er useful points of departure for examining this history between victors. Regarding the experience of defeat, the case of Germany is quite clear -the total war ended with a total defeat. But the national cases of Hungary, Estonia, Poland, Austria, and Finland all also present defeats of various sorts: they had either fought the war on the German side at one point, or su ered occupation and vast-scale destruction, or lost part or all of their national sovereignty. Linked to these di erent levels of defeat, the processing of war experiences had to adapt to the victorious war narratives in one way or another. is meant the downplaying of former cooperation with Germany and/or the presence of domestic Fascism, while in the Soviet sphere of in uence it more usually meant the outright silencing of those experiences, in contrast to the glib narrative of the liberating Red Army. is straitjacket of remembrance was stripped o when communism collapsed, but the e ects were not simply emancipatory. Over the past decades, much of Eastern and Central European memory politics of WWII comes across as a bizarre competition for 'real victimhood' , so much so that the uniqueness of the Holocaust has been in danger of being subjected to historical relativism. Yet the history of those countries in 1944-1945 and a er cannot be reduced to mere identity politics but must be studied in all its complexity. As we see, this is the only means to overcome the continuous, ethnicity-based split to collective victims and perpetrating 'others' . And this is one main reason why the questions of remembrance and memory also have a strong presence in the current volume.
In addition to the various a ermaths of defeat, a second theme brings together most of the chapters here: the ultimate importance of gender in studying post-war histories. is may be a universal phenomenon, connected to the issues of establishing and reintegrating families a er years of separation. Yet gender seems to have particular relevance in the context of lost wars. On the level of concrete experiences, an occupation and/or defeat had several gender-speci c rami cations: the absence of men and the collapse of male authority, women's high responsibility in keeping the families together, their role in communal matters and in establishing new relations, and the sexual violence of foreign soldiers. On the level of collective ideals and identities, one must add the highly gendered representations of defeat, victimhood and violence. As the chapters here show, both masculinity and femininity were o en renegotiated in a post-war situation and their rede nitions were an important vehicle in constructing new national self-images. On both levels -subjective experiences and collective identities -the analysis of gender is most useful in understanding the societal ruptures and coping strategies at the end of the war and in deconstructing national historiographies.
e third key theme of the book is to challenge the streamlined narratives of the post-war era. Even though Hungary, Estonia, Poland, Austria, Finland, and Germany each present here national cases, the chapters' topics underline the asynchronous transition to peace in individual experiences, when compared to the smooth timelines of national and international historiographies. Furthermore, it is important to note that instead of a linear chronology, both personal and collective histories tend to return back to the moments of violence and loss, thus forming continuous cycles of remembrance and forgetting. Several of the authors also pay speci c attention to the constructed and contested nature of national histories in these cycles. e role of these 'in-between' countries -and even more their peoples' multifaceted experiences -will add to the widening European history of the a ermath, thereby challenging the conventional dichotomies (Allied vs. Nazis) and periodisations (e.g., the 'Zero Hour' and the end of war, violence, and occupation in May 1945). An anthology with six case studies can only touch on some particular issues; yet we hope that the change of perspective will renew the focus on the Europe that lay between the victors. N in History, ed. D.A. Gerber, enlarged and rev. ed. (Ann Arbor: Michigan UP, 2012 Britain and Germany, 1914 -1939 (Berkeley: California UP, 2001 London: Reaktion, 1996) ; S. Kienitz, Beschädigte Helden: Kriegsinvalidität und Körperbilder 1914 -1923 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008 Soldiers and Psychiatrists 1914 (London: Pimlico, 2002 ; V. Kivimäki, Battled Nerves: Finnish Soldiers' War Experience, Trauma, and Military Psychiatry, 1941-44 (PhD thesis: Åbo Akademi, 2013 
